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The typical indicators used to assess a school’s performance—average and median
achievement test scores—are highly flawed. Simulation results indicate that these indicators provide a
severely misleading portrait of changes in school performance over time and differences in
performance across schools, particularly if students change schools a lot or school performance varies
significantly over time. Moreover, these indicators provide schools with the incentive to cater to
students who score high on achievement tests, and they tend to be biased against schools that serve a
large number of academically disadvantaged students. Better than average and median test scores are
gain indicators, which measure the growth in achievement from one grade to the next for a given
group of students, and value-added indicators, which rely on a statistical model to identify the distinct
contributions of schools to growth in student achievement at a given grade level. In order to
implement valid school performance indicators, schools should test students every two years, if not
annually, beginning with kindergarten; collect better data on student and family characteristics; and
develop tests that are sound and attuned to their educational goals.Educational Performance Indicators: A Critique
I. INTRODUCTION
Educational outcome indicators increasingly are being used to assess the efficacy of American
education. Local newspapers regularly report how students in local schools perform on nationally
standardized tests; a growing number of states publish state and local school report cards that provide
an assortment of student outcome, enrollment, and financial indicators; and the federal government,
with the support of the nation’s governors, has dramatically expanded the nation’s testing program.
The growth of educational outcome indicators has been motivated in large part by a growing
demand to hold schools accountable for their performance, defined in terms of outcomes, such as
standardized test scores, rather than inputs, such as teacher qualifications, class size, and the number of
books in school libraries. States that have dramatically increased expenditures on education or have
launched major school improvement efforts have been particularly likely to adopt extensive indicator
systems. The increased demand for public accountability in elementary and secondary education
parallels similar demands for increased accountability in other public sector activities, for example, the
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and the JOBS program, enacted as part of the Family Support
Act.
Despite the groundswell of interest in data on school performance, many educators and
scholars fear that a poorly implemented performance indicator system could ultimately be worse than
no indicators at all. These fears are not groundless. Performance indicators based on achievement
tests could be flawed in three major ways. First, the achievement test underlying a performance
indicator could fail to reflect a school’s true educational objectives or otherwise lack validity. As is
well known, many educators believe that the vast majority of tests, particularly standardized, multiple
choice tests, currently exhibit this flaw. In particular, there is concern that these tests focus almost
exclusively on low level academic content and have little to do with schools’ educational goals.2
(Smith and O’Day, 1990; Clune, 1991). As a result, many school districts, states, and professional test
developers are currently experimenting with new types of assessments, including tests with open-ended
questions, performance-based assessments, and graded portfolios.
1 Second, a performance indicator
could be susceptible to "corruption." For example, a test that is administered year after year could be
corrupted if instructors teach narrowly to the test, as opposed to the content domain that underlies the
test.
2 Finally, a performance indicator constructed from a simplistic or otherwise inappropriate
statistical model could fail to measure the true contribution of a school to growth in measured student
achievement. If any one of these flaws exists in a high-stakes system of educational performance
indicators, the system could severely distort the behavior of educators and students.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the third factor, the statistical adequacy of the most
commonly used educational performance indicators. Several major conclusions emerge from the
analysis. First, the typical indicators used to assess school performance—average and median test
scores—are highly flawed as measures of school performance, even if they are derived from highly
valid assessments. As a result, they are of limited value, if not useless, for evaluating relative school
performance or school performance over time and thus should not be used to hold schools accountable
for their performance. Indeed, simulation results indicate that changes over time in average test scores
could very well be negatively correlated with actual changes in school performance.
Second, the typical indicators used to assess school performance are likely to provide schools
with the perverse incentive to "cream," that is, to raise measured school performance by educating
only those students that tend to have high test scores. The potential for creaming is apt to be
particularly strong in environments characterized by selective admissions. However, creaming could
1See, for example, Wiggins (1989), Darling-Hammond (1991), Shepard (1991), and Koretz et al.
(1994).
2See, for example, Haladyna, Nolen, and Haas (1991), Nolen, Haladyna, and Haas (1992), Smith
and Rottenberg (1991), and Shepard (1991).3
also exist in more subtle, but no less harmful, forms. For example, schools could create an
environment that is relatively unsupportive for potential dropouts, academically disadvantaged students,
and special education students, thereby encouraging these students to drop out of or transfer to another
school. Second, schools could aggressively retain students at given grade levels (Shepard, 1991).
Finally, high-quality teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood schools that
predominantly serve high-scoring students.
Third, typical school performance indicators tend to be biased against schools that
disproportionately serve academically disadvantaged students. One source of bias is the well-known
fact that school productivity is only one of the many determinants of student achievement. Most of
the variation in average or median test scores can usually be accounted for by differences across
schools in the types of students enrolled. A second source of bias is that school-performance targets,
specified in terms of average or median test scores, are likely to be much lower than properly
specified (value-added) measures of school performance for schools that disproportionately serve
academically disadvantaged students. This has the obvious effect of understating the effort and
perhaps resources required to raise schools of this type up to a target level of student achievement.
Finally, given the problem of student mobility (as well as several other problems discussed in
the paper), it is not possible to construct statistically valid school performance indicators if tests,
assessments, or other student outcomes are measured so infrequently that a significant proportion of
students change schools in between periods of testing. In particular, the simulation results reported in
the paper suggest that it is simply not enough to test students every four years (for example, in grades
4, 8, and 12), as is currently done in the National Assessment of Education Progress and some state
testing programs. This may be okay at the national level, since student mobility in and out of the4
country is limited. For purposes of constructing school, district, and perhaps state indicators, however,
it appears to be necessary to test with much greater frequency.
3
Given the substantial problems that exist with common educational indicators, what should be
done to improve the situation? If one is interested in having indicators that are appropriate for
accountability purposes, I believe that the only solution is to design an indicator system that avoids the
three major flaws listed at the outset of this paper. There are reasons to be optimistic that it is
possible to do this. A number of states have recently made great strides in designing new tests and
assessments that are specifically aligned with state educational goals and appear to avoid many of the
problems of multiple-choice tests. From the statistical perspective, the performance indicators
implemented in South Carolina, Tennessee, and Dallas, Texas, appear to be particularly promising.
They measure school performance using value-added measures of school performance. The other
option is to give up on the idea of using outcome indicators to hold schools accountable for their
performance. As stated earlier, this option could very well dominate the option of retaining an
indicator system that was not originally designed to drive a high-stakes accountability system. If
policymakers are serious about holding schools and districts accountable for their contribution to
growth in student achievement, it is crucial to measure that contribution validly using student outcome
measures that accurately reflect schools’ educational goals.
The paper is organized in seven major sections, including the introduction, Section I. Section
II presents a simple value-added model of student achievement growth that provides a standard against
which alternative indicators of school performance can be evaluated. Section III draws on a series of
simulations to demonstrate that the average test score is highly flawed as an indicator of school
performance. Section IV draws on data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress to
3The need for frequent testing lends further support to the idea that tests and assessments need to
be closely aligned to educational goals and, if possible, to add to, rather than distract from, the
educational process (Clune, 1991; Smith and O’Day, 1990).5
illustrate the problems that arise from interpreting the average test score as an indicator of school
performance. Section V evaluates the consequences of using flawed indicators as the foundation of a
school accountability system. Section VI considers the data required to construct valid and reliable
value-added indicators. Section VII addresses the issue of whether value-added indicators lead to
higher or lower performance expectations for schools that disproportionately serve disadvantaged
students. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper. Two appendices provide technical information on
the simulations reported in section III.
II. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE STATISTICAL VALIDITY OF PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS
Standardized student testing is conducted for a variety of reasons: to provide information on
individual students and to provide aggregate school-level indicators. At the student level, for example,
standardized test scores may be used to diagnose student strengths and weaknesses in subskill areas, to
guide teachers in providing instruction that matches the needs of individual students, to guide students
in making curriculum and career choices, to determine whether students are eligible for graduation (in
states that have minimum competency examinations), and to guide postsecondary institutions and
employers in making admissions and hiring decisions, respectively.
These data, if aggregated to the classroom or school level, yield educational indicators that
measure, for example, the share of students scoring above or below certain thresholds, the average
level of achievement, or the median level of achievement. I refer generally to statistics of this kind as
level indicators. Level indicators are widely reported by schools and states. Indeed, they are
calculated and readily made available by the companies that provide testing services to schools
throughout the nation (Goldman, 1990). They are also reported at the national level by the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Unfortunately, some of the level indicators reported by6
schools and states are subject to obvious statistical flaws. Well-known examples include average SAT
and ACT scores. The problem with these indicators is that they are based on nonrandomly selected
groups of students, in particular, those students that aspire to attend selective colleges or universities.
As discussed by Hanushek and Taylor (1990), Powell and Steelman (1984), and Wainer (1986), these
indicators tend to be highly unreliable as measures of the true level of achievement in schools and
states. In this paper, I will limit my analysis to level indicators that are not subject to these problems.
Level indicators, if correctly constructed and based on appropriate tests or assessments, convey
potentially useful descriptive information concerning the proficiency levels of students in particular
classrooms or schools. Indeed, they could sensibly be used to target assistance (financial or otherwise)
to schools that serve students with low test scores. The critical question for this paper is whether such
indicators are adequate for purposes of holding schools accountable for their performance. To do so
they must validly measure school or classroom performance, in particular, the contribution of schools
to growth in student achievement for students in particular grades or sequence of grades. As will be
demonstrated in this paper, level indicators fail to do this, often by a huge margin.
In order to evaluate the validity of alternative school performance indicators it is necessary to
specify the benchmark indicators that will be used as the standard of comparison for all other
indicators. Consistent with the vast literature on the determinants of achievement growth, I define true
school performance using a statistical, value-added model (see, for example, Dyer, Linn, and Patton,
1969; Hanushek, 1972, Murnane, 1975; Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986; Willms and Raudenbush, 1989;
Hanushek and Taylor, 1990; and Meyer, 1992). Since the primary objective of this paper is to assess
the statistical validity of common outcome indicators, I assume that achievement growth from one
grade to the next can be adequately characterized by a two-level, linear growth model (Willett, 1988):
where i indexes individual students, s indexes schools, g indexes grade levels, and t indexes school
years; Y represents student achievement for a given individual in grade g in year t; X(i) represents a7
set (vector) of individual and family characteristics, assumed (for simplicity) to be invariant over time;
(1)
S(i,s,g,t) is an indicator variable equal to one if student i is enrolled in school s in grade g in year t,
zero otherwise; C(s,g,t) represents a set (vector) of community characteristics and school-aggregate
student characteristics (for example, average socioeconomic status); b(g) and g(g) are parameters
(vectors) that capture the effects of X and C on growth in student achievement; a(s,g,t) is a school
effect; and e(i,g,t) is a random component of student achievement growth assumed to be uncorrelated
with all regressors included in the model.
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The model has a straightforward interpretation: student achievement in a given grade in a
given year is equal to student achievement in the prior year and grade, plus a term b(g)X(i) that
reflects the contribution of individual and family characteristics to growth in student achievement, a
term (in brackets in the second line) that reflects the growth in student achievement as a result of
attending a given school, and a random term. The effect of attending a given school can further be
broken down into two parts: a component a(s,g,t) that is the result of differences in school policies,
4This model is a reasonable one if the pre- and post-test scores are scaled so that achievement is
measured in the same units. If this is not the case, the model could be extended to allow the pre-test
variable to have its own coefficient, possibly different from the value of one that is imposed in the
above model. This model has often been used in previous studies. However, Meyer (1992)
demonstrates that in a model of this type it is necessary to correct for measurement error in the pre-
test variable. Note that the model is defined only for students who attend a given school for the entire
school year and have achievement test data both prior to and at the end of the school year. Students
who fail to meet these conditions must be excluded from the analysis. In principle, this problem could
be avoided by testing students more than once a year, although this would be an expensive and
burdensome proposition.8
teacher quality, etc., and a component that captures the contribution of community and school-
aggregate student characteristics to school effectiveness.
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The former factor a(s,g,t) measures the contribution of a school to growth in student
achievement after controlling for all factors that are external to the school. I refer to this indicator as
a measure of intrinsic school performance.
6 Willms and Raudenbush (1989) refer to this indicator as
a Type B indicator. This indicator can be interpreted as a measure of the collective performance of
school staff (at a given grade level) and thus is the indicator that is appropriate for purposes of school
accountability. A second value-added indicator, a measure of total school performance, is given by
a(s,g,t) + g(g) C(s,g,t). Willms and Raudenbush refer to this indicator as a Type A indicator. This
indicator reflects the intrinsic performance of a school (a) plus the part of school performance that is
determined by factors external to the school (community, and school-aggregate student
characteristics).
7 One interpretation of this indicator is that it captures the effect of enrolling one
additional student in a school, holding community characteristics and the composition of the student
group approximately fixed. If these characteristics are relatively stable from year to year, the total
school performance indicator is appropriate for purposes of informing school choice. In this paper I
focus primarily on the intrinsic school performance indicator.
The value-added indicators derived from equation (1) define school performance at a specific
grade level at a particular point in time. The average test score, on the other hand, reflects the
5Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) discuss methods for estimating models of this type.
6The intrinsic school performance indicator is implicitly defined by the school-level control
variables (C) included in the model. At a minimum, school-level measures of student and
neighborhood characteristics should be included in the model since these variables are determined
externally to the school (at least in the short term). The model could also include variables such as
per pupil expenditures and the quality of building facilities in order to control for school inputs that
may not be controllable by principals and teachers.
7See Gamoran (1992) for a survey of research on the effects of school-aggregate student
characteristics on school performance.9
contribution of school, family, and community inputs at all grades prior to the year students are tested.
In order to be able to assess the validity of the average test score as a measure of school performance
it is necessary to aggregate the grade-specific indicators to obtain an aggregate indicator that measures
performance over a sequence of grades, say, 4th through 8th grade or 1st through 10th grade. An
aggregate indicator that does this is derived below. I refer to it as a steady state indicator.
The steady state indicator can be motivated in the following way. Imagine that a given school
enters a steady state in year t such that the productivity of the school at all grade levels stays constant.
For a given group of students who attend school s from grade g1 to g2, achievement in grade g2 is then
given by
8
where the steady state indicator SS(s,g1,g2,t) is given by
9
(2)
This equation is similar in form to equation (1): student achievement in grade g2 is equal to student
(3)
achievement prior to grade g1, the cumulative contribution of individual, family, and community
characteristics to growth in student achievement over grades g1 to g2, the steady state contribution of
8This equation is derived by successively substituting the equation for Y(g2-1,t) into the equation
for Y(g2,t), etc.
9A closely related indicator is steady state performance per grade
This indicator is appropriate for comparing the performance of schools that may not have the same
number of grades.10
the school over grades g1 to g2, and the cumulative contribution of random components of growth. (A
steady state indicator of total school performance would also include the terms in the second line of
(2).) The steady state indicator defined above is intuitively quite plausible in the context of the model
of achievement growth adopted in this paper. It is simply the sum of school performance indicators in
year t over the specified range of grades.
10 As will be demonstrated below, this indicator is
potentially quite different from a school-level average test score.
Given the above model of student achievement growth, it is possible to define and evaluate all
of the outcome indicators commonly used to evaluate schools. In this paper I focus on the most
common of all outcome indicators, the average test score, and a simple alternative to that indicator, the
gain indicator. In order to define these indicators in terms of the parameters of the value-added model
it is necessary to introduce some additional notation. For any variable, a bar over the variable name
denotes the school-level mean for the group of students enrolled in school s in grade g in year t. For
example, the school-level average of X(i) in school s in grade g and year t is given by and the
school-level average of S(i, s’, g’, t’) is given by . The latter variable is simply the
fraction of students (since S is a zero/one indicator) in school s in grade g in year t who previously
were enrolled in school s’ in grade g’ in year t’.
Given this notation the gain indicator is defined by
(4)
10The steady state indicator presented in this paper can be adapted to handle a wide range of
alternative achievement growth models. The specific formula for the steady state indicator depends on
the exact structure of the value-added model.11
that is, the growth in average achievement from one grade to the next for a given cohort of
students.
11 This indicator, in general, is very different from the change over time in average
achievement at a given grade level, as is indicated below. Given the assumed model of achievement




In other words, the average gain in student achievement is equal to intrinsic school performance plus
an adjustment factor that reflects the aggregate, school-level effects of student, family, and community
characteristics on student achievement growth. It is immediately apparent that the gain indicator, taken
as a measure of intrinsic school performance, overstates the performance of schools that
disproportionately serve students and communities that are academically advantaged. The opposite is
true for schools that disproportionately serve students and communities that are academically
disadvantaged. The gain indicator is thus biased against schools of the latter type, if it is interpreted
as a measure of school performance. (The criticism also applies to the average test score, as discussed
below). The effects on schools of using this indicator for accountability purposes are explored later in
the paper.
In order to derive an appropriate formula for the average test score, equation (1) must be
rewritten so as to eliminate the prior test score variables for all grades beyond the initial one, grade
11The gain indicator has a meaningful interpretation only if the post- and pre-test scores are scaled
so that achievement is measured in the same units.
12For simplicity, the average error is excluded from this equation.12
0.
13 This yields a reduced form model (see Boardman and Murnane, 1979) that expresses student
achievement as the outcome of initial achievement, the contribution of student, community, and
intrinsic school effects for all prior grades, and the sum of all prior individual error terms. The
average test score for students in school s in grade 10, say, in year t is then given by
14
(6)
In other words, average 10th grade achievement for a given group of students in school s in year t is
the sum of three terms (on the first three lines) that reflect differences across schools in student,
family, and community characteristics
15 and a term (on the last line) that reflects the intrinsic school
performances of all schools attended by the given group of students in grades 1 through 10. The latter
term, although similar to the steady state indicator, differs from it in two important respects. First, it
reflects the intrinsic performance of all schools attended by students in grades 1 through 10 (not just
13As in the case of the steady state indicator, this equation is derived by successively substituting
the equation for Y(g2-1, t-1) into the equation for Y(g2, t), etc.
14Again, for simplicity, the average error term is excluded from this equation.
15The three terms represent the average initial achievement of the students prior to entering 1st
grade, the effect of student-level individual and family characteristics, and the effect of school-level
characteristics at all schools attended by the group of students in grades one through ten.13
the school in which the students are enrolled in grade 10).
16 Second, it reflects the intrinsic
performance of schools over a ten-year period (not just the current year).
In the next section I draw on equation (6) to conduct a detailed comparison of the difference
between average test scores and intrinsic school performance, measured at each grade level and as a
steady state aggregate.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE AVERAGE TEST SCORE AS A MEASURE OF SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND SIMULATION RESULTS
The average test score is highly flawed as a measure of school performance for four basic
reasons. One, as in the case of the gain indicator, the average test score is contaminated by factors
other than school performance, in particular, the average level of student achievement prior to entering
1st grade—average initial achievement—and the average effects of student, family, and community
characteristics on student achievement growth from 1st grade through the grade in which students are
tested. (These factors are given in the first three lines of equation (6)). In fact, it is quite likely that
comparisons across schools of average test scores primarily reflect these differences rather than
genuine differences in intrinsic school performance. As such, average test scores are highly biased
against schools that disproportionately serve academically disadvantaged students and communities.
Two, the average test score reflects information about school performance that tends to be
grossly out of date. For example, consider the average test score for a group of 10th grade students.
The test scores for these students reflect learning that occurred in kindergarten, roughly 10½ years
16In the 1st grade, for example, the contribution of each school (a(s’, 1, t-9)) to the average test
score for school s is weighted by
the fraction of students in school s who attended school s’ in 1st grade (nine years earlier).14
earlier, through the 10th grade. Indeed, a 10th grade level indicator could be dominated by
information that is five or more years old.
17 The fact that average test scores reflect out of date
information severely weakens them as instruments of public accountability. In order to allow
educators to react in a timely and responsible fashion, performance indicators presumably must reflect
information that is current.
Three, average test scores at the school, district, and state levels tend to be highly
contaminated due to student mobility in and out of different schools. For example, the typical high
school student is likely to attend several different schools over the period spanning kindergarten
through 12th grade. For these students, a test score reflects the contributions of more than one and
possibly many different schools. The problem of contamination is compounded by the fact that rates
of student mobility may differ dramatically across schools. Contamination is apt to be especially high
in communities that undergo rapid population growth or decline and in communities that experience
significant changes in their occupational and industrial structure. Contamination due to student
mobility is probably a relatively minor problem at the national level, since rates of in- and out-
migration are low compared to rates of mobility within the nation, but at the state, district, and school
levels it is apt to be quite serious.
Finally, unlike the grade-specific value-added indicator, the average test score fails to localize
school performance to a specific classroom or grade level—the natural unit of accountability in a
traditional school. This lack of localization is, of course, most severe at the highest grade levels. A
performance indicator that fails to localize school performance to a specific grade level or classroom is
likely to be a relatively weak instrument of public accountability.
17This would occur, for example, if the variability over time of school performance is higher in
elementary school than in middle or high school.15
In summary, the average test score suffers from four major flaws, any one of which could be
sufficient to invalidate it as a measure of school performance:
− failure to localize school performance to specific grade levels,
− aggregation of performance information that is grossly out of date,
− contamination due to student mobility,
− contamination due to nonschool factors (students, family, and community
characteristics).
The latter flaw is also shared by the gain indicator.
Below, I present a series of simulations that illustrate how these factors have the potential to
dramatically distort the average test score as a measure of school performance. The simulations
illustrate the consequences of each factor separately. In practice, of course, all four problems are
likely to coexist.
The simulations are designed to assess the validity of the average test score with respect to
two applications: (1) comparisons of indicators across schools and (2) comparisons of indicators over
time for the same school. The latter type of comparison is particularly relevant for the purposes of
evaluating the efficacy of school reform efforts.
In the first three sets of simulations reported in this section, I assume that average initial
achievement and average student characteristics are identical for all schools at all points in time.
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Hence, the analysis focuses on problems created by the last line of equation (6). Given alternative
assumptions concerning the pattern of intrinsic school performances over time and across grade levels,
I compute the average level of achievement at the end of grade 10 using equation (6) and the steady
state indicator for grades 1 through 10 using equation (3). In all but one of the simulations I assume,
18I also assume that the average error at every school at every point in time is zero. I invoke this
assumption so that I can ignore the issue of reliability and focus entirely on the validity—or lack of
validity—of indicators.16
for simplicity, that school performance is identical at all grade levels in a given year. For these
simulations the steady state indicator is equal to ten times the grade-level indicator of school
performance. To facilitate comparisons across schools, I standardize the intrinsic school performance
values so that they are approximately centered around zero and range from -20 to 20. The technical
details of the simulations are presented in Appendices A and B. Appendix A also includes all of the
simulation data reported in the graphs discussed in the text.
The first pair of simulations illustrate the failure of average test scores to localize school
performance to specific grade levels. Subsequent simulations illustrate the consequences of
aggregation of out-of-date information, student mobility, and differences across schools in student,
family, and community characteristics.
The first simulation, as summarized in Table 1, contrasts three schools that differ in terms of
their patterns of school performance in grades 1 through 5 and grades 6 through 10, respectively. To
simplify the analysis I assume that these patterns persist over time and that there is no student
mobility. School 1 exhibits school-performance values of 0 (the average) at all grade levels. School 2
exhibits exceptionally high school performance values in the lower grades and exceptionally low
school-performance values in the higher grades. Finally, school 3 exhibits a pattern of school
performance values that is exactly opposite to the pattern exhibited for school 2. As indicated, the
three schools differ fundamentally in terms of their school performance values in the early and late
grades. Despite these differences, however, the schools are indistinguishable in terms of their average
level of achievement at the end of 10th grade. The exceptionally high and the exceptionally low
performance values simply cancel out for schools 2 and 3.
A similar result is observed in the second simulation, as depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1 charts
the average level of 10th grade achievement over time, prior to and after the implementation of
hypothetical academic reforms in 1992. The academic reforms are assumed to follow an era of17
TABLE 1
Average 10th Grade Achievement by School,
Given Alternative Patterns of Intrinsic School Performance
Intrinsic School Performance by Grade
Initial Grades Grades Achievement at the
School Achievement 1 to 5 6 to 10 End of Tenth
Grade
10 0 0 0
2 0 20 -20 0
3 0 -20 20 0
Source: Data simulated by author.18
Figure 1 here19
stable, but average, school performance at all grade levels. Panels A and B in Figure 1 depict two
different scenarios. In Panel A school performance at each grade level increases gradually after 1991.
In Panel B, school performance also increases steadily, but the improvement is limited to grades 7 to
10. As in the previous simulation, the two schools differ substantially in terms of their school
performance values at different grade levels. Despite these differences, however, there is no
perceptible difference between the two schools in terms of average 10th grade achievement. In short,
these two simulations demonstrate that average test scores provide no information on differences in
productivity between different levels of a school system. They do, however, suggest that average test
scores provide at least a rough indication of the productivity of the school system, overall. In fact,
this is generally not true, as is demonstrated below.
The second set of simulations illustrates the problem of school performance information that
tends to be grossly out of date. These simulations demonstrate vividly how average test scores are
determined in large part by past gains in achievement and hence are apt to be quite misleading as
indicators of current achievement gains. To highlight the problem of aggregation across time and
grade levels I assume that school performance within a school is identical at all grade levels and that
there is no student mobility. Figure 2 charts average 10th grade achievement and school performance
over time, prior to and after the introduction of hypothetical academic reforms in 1992. Panel A of
Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which academic reforms reverse a trend of gradual deterioration in
school performance across all grades and initiate a trend of gradual improvement in school
performance across all grades. Panel B of Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which academic reforms have
absolutely no effect on school performance. The reforms, however, are preceded by an era of gradual
deterioration in school performance across all grades, followed by a brief period (1987 to 1991) of
gradual improvement across all grades. As indicated in the graph, the average 10th grade test score
provides a totally misleading view of the effectiveness of the hypothetical academic reforms20
Figure 2 here21
implemented in 1992. In Panel A, the average 10th grade test score declines for five years after the
introduction of successful reforms. In Panel B, the average 10th grade test score increases for a
decade after the introduction of reforms that have no effect on student achievement growth. These
results are admittedly somewhat counterintuitive. They arise from the fact that 10th grade
achievement is the product of gains in achievement accumulated over a ten-year period.
19 The noise
introduced by this type of aggregation is inevitable if school performance is at all variable over time.
(The interested reader may want to peruse Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4. These tables provide
additional information concerning the two simulations discussed above.)
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The problem of aggregation of information that is grossly out of date also introduces noise
into the comparisons of different schools at the same point in time. The degree to which noise of this
type affects the relative ranking of schools depends on whether the variance over time in average
achievement growth is large relative to the variance across schools in achievement growth. To
illustrate this point, Figure 3 considers the consequences of aggregation over time and grade levels for
two schools that are identical in terms of school performance over the long term. In the short term,
however, school performance is assumed to vary cyclically. For school 1, school performance
alternates between ten years of gradual decline and ten years of gradual recovery. For school 2,
school performance alternates between ten years of gradual improvement and ten years of gradual
decline. These patterns are depicted in Panel B of Figure 3. The correct ranking of schools, based on
school performance, is noted in the graph. Panel A depicts the associated levels of average 10th
19In the simulations discussed in the text, the average 10th grade test score is, in fact, exactly equal
to a ten year moving average of school performance. This stems from the simple assumption that
school performance is identical at different grade levels in the same year.
20The tables in Appendix A report school performance by grade level and cohort. As indicated in
the text, school performance changes from year to year but is always identical across different grade
levels in the same year. This shows up in Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4 as school performance
values that are equal on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top right of the tables.22
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grade achievement for the two schools. The ranking of schools based on this indicator is also noted.
The striking aspect of Figure 3 is that the average 10th grade test score ranks the two schools correctly
only 50 percent of the time. In short, the noise introduced by aggregation over time and grade levels
is particularly troublesome if one is comparing schools that are roughly comparable in terms of long-
term school performance. On the other hand, this problem is less serious for schools that differ
dramatically in terms of long-term average school performance. It is also less serious if cycles of
decline and improvement tend to be perfectly correlated across schools. This seems unlikely as a
general rule.
The third set of simulations illustrates the possible consequences of contamination due to
student mobility. These simulations illustrate the extreme sensitivity of average test scores to in-
migration of students. To highlight the consequences of student mobility I assume that school
performance within a school is identical at all grade levels and over time.
The first simulation envisions an environment in which there are three types of schools that
vary in terms of school performance.
21 Student mobility is assumed to follow a Markov process: at
the end of each school year all students either stay in their current school or move, with some
probability, to one of the other two schools. The technical details of this simulation are reported in
Appendix B. Panel A of Table 2 reports the effects on average 10th grade achievement of alternative
rates of student mobility among the three schools. (The reported averages are population means, as
opposed to means from a particular random sample. As is illustrated below, sample means are likely
to be quite variable, particularly in small schools.) Panel B reports the associated standard deviations
21School performance is assumed to be equal to 10, 0, and -10, respectively, in the three types of
schools. See Appendix B for additional details.24
TABLE 2
Average 10th Grade Achievement By School Type,
Given Alternative Rates of Student Mobility
Annual Mobility Rate (Percent)
School Type 0 5 10 20 40 60
A. Average Tenth Grade Achievement
High Performance 100* 72.2 53.5 32.4 16.7 11.1
Medium Performance 0* 0000 0
Low Performance -100* -72.2 -53.5 -32.4 -16.7 11.1
B. Standard Deviation of Tenth Grade Achievement
High or Low Performance 0 46.1 51.3 47.6 35.5 26.8
Medium Performance 0 32.3 39.0 40.9 33.9 26.6
All 81.6 72.4 64.6 52.6 37.5 28.3
C. The Fraction of Students Who Change Schools
One or More Times (Percent)
Change over 9 years
(grades 1 to 10) 0 37.0 61.3 86.6 99.0 100.0
Change over 4 years
(say, grades 4 to 8) 0 18.5 34.4 59.0 87.0 97.4
Source: Data simulated by author.
*In this simulation, average 10th grade achievement and steady state school performance are identical
if the mobility rate is zero.25
in student achievement. Panel C reports the fraction of students who change schools between grades 1
and 10 and over a four-year period, say between the 4th and 8th grade, given alternative annual rates
of student mobility. Notice that student mobility causes average 10th grade test scores to collapse
toward zero, the average level. For the high- and low-performance schools, for example, an annual
mobility rate of 20 percent leads to a reduction in average test scores of over 70 percent. Similarly, an
annual mobility rate of 40 percent caused a reduction in average test scores of 83 percent. In other
words, the average test score is severely biased against high-performance schools that happen to serve
highly mobile student populations. These numbers suggest that average test scores are apt to be highly
misleading indicators of school quality for schools exposed to high rates of student mobility.
22
The numbers reported above (in Panel A of Table 2) actually understate the degree to which
random mobility distorts the average test score as an indicator of school performance. In practice,
average test scores are likely to vary substantially across small schools due to the random nature of
mobility, even for schools with identical mobility rates. (Variation in means is a direct function of
school size.) This problem is therefore apt to be especially serious among elementary schools and
relatively small high schools. To illustrate the problem, Figure 4 reports the likely spread in average
test scores for schools with twenty and fifty 10th grade students, respectively. For each type of school
(high, medium, and low performance), the top average test score is equal to the population mean plus
twice the standard error of the mean, and the bottom average test score is equal to the population
mean minus twice the standard error of the mean.
The results reported in Figure 4 are striking. For high-performance schools with twenty 10th
grade students the range in average test scores is from 30.6 to 76.4, given a mobility rate of only 10
22This conclusion is based on the assumption that at least some student mobility occurs across
schools of different quality, a reasonable supposition, I think, in the absence of contrary data.26
Figure 4 here27
percent. At a mobility rate of 40 percent, the distributions actually overlap. Given a 10th grade class
of fifty students, average test scores range from 6.7 to 26.7 for high-performance schools, and from -
9.6 to 9.6 for medium-performance schools. In summary, both of the above simulations demonstrate
that random student mobility has a potentially enormous impact on average test scores.
Of course, rates and patterns of student mobility may vary over time as school systems merge,
communities grow, and the occupational structure of jobs evolve in a local labor market. As is
illustrated below, idiosyncratic patterns of mobility are also apt to provide a misleading picture of
actual changes in school quality over time. Figure 5 simulates the effects on average 10th grade
achievement of an influx of students from a low-quality to a high-quality school. Panel A of Figure 5
simulates the effects of a gradual influx of students that takes place over a ten-year period: 1992
through 2001. Panel B simulates the effects of an instant influx of students in 1992. Despite the fact
that school performance remains constant after the influx of students, average achievement levels
decline precipitously following the influx of students under either scenario. In the case of the gradual
influx of students, the average level of achievement declines by as much as 50 percent. Moreover,
average achievement does not return to its 1991 level until the year 2010. In the case of the instant
influx of students, the average level of achievement falls instantly by 90 percent and is back to its
1991 level within a decade. In short, idiosyncratic shifts in patterns of student mobility have the
potential to grossly contaminate the average test score as an indicator of contemporaneous school
performance.
The final simulation illustrates the potential consequences of differences across schools in
student, family, and community characteristics for both the gain indicator and the average 10th grade
test score. To highlight the consequences of this factor I make the following assumptions: (1) school
performance differs among schools but does not vary across grades and years, (2) the effects
(represented by the parameters b and g) of student, family, and community characteristics on28
(Figure 5 here)29
achievement growth are identical in all grades, (3) there is no student mobility, and (4) initial average
test scores are identical in all schools. Given these assumptions, the average 10th grade test score is
given simply by
where the first term represents the average contribution of student, family, and community
characteristics to student achievement growth in grades 1 through 10—the student and community
adjustment factor—and 10 a(s) represents the steady state indicator of intrinsic school performance.
23
I assume that steady state school performance ranges from -200 to 200 and the student and
community adjustment factor ranges from -300 to 300. The greater spread of the latter factor reflects
the implicit assumption that there is significant stratification across schools in terms of student, family,
and community characteristics and that these characteristics account for substantially more of the
variation in student achievement than in school performance.
As indicated in Table 3, for a medium performance school (second column from the right) the
average 10th grade test score ranges from -300 to 300, solely because of differences across schools in
average student, family, and community characteristics. In comparison, among schools that represent
the middle of the distribution of student, family, and community characteristics (fourth row of the
table), the average test score ranges from -200 (a low-performance school) to 200 (a high-performance
school). Given the assumptions of this model, it is evident that differences across schools in student,
family, and community characteristics could potentially obscure or eliminate differences that exist
among schools in actual performance. To see this, note that there are three schools in Table 3 that are
about average with respect to average 10th grade test scores (the data are
23The gain indicator is given simply by the average test score divided by 10.30
TABLE 3
Average 10th Grade Test Score by School, Given Variation
in Average Student, Family, and Community Characteristics
and Steady State Intrinsic School Performance
Average Test
Student Score by Steady State School Performance
and Community Low Med. High
Adjustment Factor (-200) (0) (200)
-300 -500 -300 -100
-200 -400 -200 0
-100 -300 -100 100
0 -200 0 200
100 -100 100 300
200 0 200 400
300 100 300 500
Source: Data simulated by author.31
circled in the table, for convenience). In fact, these schools vary enormously in terms of their school
performance, ranging from a low of -200 to a high of 200.
In short, it is clear that the average test score and the gain indicator are measures that, if
interpreted as measures of school performance, are highly biased against schools that
disproportionately serve academically disadvantaged students and communities.
The simulations presented in this section demonstrate that the average test score has the
potential to provide a totally misleading portrait of educational productivity, both over time and across
schools. Even so, the simulations possibly understate the degree to which this indicator is flawed as a
valid measure of school performance since they address the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation,
student mobility, and differences across schools in student, family, and community characteristics one
at a time, not simultaneously.
The good news is that the gain indicator, if it can be computed, and the value-added indicator
avoid three of the four problems that plague the average test score as a measure of school
performance. The value-added indicator has the major advantage that it also eliminates the bias that
exists in the gain indicator due to differences across schools in student, family, and community
characteristics.
The next section presents a real-world example in which the gain indicator provides a
substantially more accurate portrait of changes over time in school performance than the average test
score.
IV. AN EXAMPLE BASED ON NATIONAL DATA
The real-world significance of the above analysis is illustrated using data on average
mathematics scores from 1973 to 1986 from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
As indicated in Panel A of Table 4, NAEP scores for the 11th grade exhibit the by now32
TABLE 4
NAEP Mathematics Exam Data
Grade/Age 1973 1978 1982 1986
Average Test Score
(A)
3rd/9 219.1 218.6 219.0 221.7
7th/13 266.0 264.1 268.6 269.0
11th/17 304.4 300.4 298.5 302.0
Average Test Score Gain
(B)
73 to 78 78 to 82 82 to 86
3rd to 7th/9 to 13 45.0 50.0 50.0
7th to 11th/13 to 17 34.4 34.4 33.4
Source: Dossey et al. (1988).33
familiar pattern of sharp declines from 1973 to 1982 and then partial recovery between 1982 and 1986.
The 11th grade data, by themselves, are fully consistent with the premise that academic reforms in the
early and mid-1980s generated substantial gains in academic achievement. In fact, an analysis of the
data based on gain indicators rather than average test scores suggests the opposite conclusion—see
panel B of Table 4. Gain indicators were constructed in panel B by computing the change in average
test scores over time for given birth cohorts.
24
The gain indicators reveal that achievement growth during the 1982–1986 period was actually
no better than achievement growth during the prior 1978–1982 period. In fact, gains from the 7th to
the 11th grade were actually slightly lower during the 1982–1986 period than in previous periods!
The rise in 11th grade math scores from 1982 to 1986 stems from an earlier increase in achievement
growth for that cohort rather than from an increase in achievement growth over grades 7 to 11. In
short, these data provide no support for the notion that high school academic reforms generated
significant increases in test scores during the mid-1980s. These data also vividly confirm the general
superiority of gain indicators, relative to level indicators, as measures of educational productivity.
It would be interesting to report the above analysis using value-added as opposed to gain
indicators. Unfortunately, the NAEP data do not permit such an analysis to be conducted since the
same students are not sampled for two consecutive NAEP surveys. This weakness in NAEP data
could be remedied by switching to a survey design that was at least partially longitudinal.
25
24NAEP was originally designed to permit this type of analysis. In mathematics, the tests have
generally been given every four years at grade levels spaced four years apart. For this illustrative
analysis, we assume that average test scores in 1973 are comparable to the unknown 1974 scores.
25Given that the NAEP, at present, assesses students only in grades 4, 8, and 12, it would be
necessary as part of a longitudinal survey design to locate students that changed schools within the
four-year interval between tests. Of course, there are other important technical problems that would
also need to be addressed.34
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF USING FLAWED INDICATORS
The fact that gain and level indicators measure school performance with potentially enormous
error has important implications for the use of these indicators for making education policy, informing
students and parents about the quality of alternative schools, and evaluating school performance as part
of a high-stakes accountability system. With respect to the first issue, it is clear from the simulations
and from the NAEP example that level indicators potentially provide totally incorrect information
concerning the success or failure of educational interventions and reforms. As a result, making policy
on the basis of such information could lead to the expansion of programs that do not work and to the
cancellation of programs that are truly effective. Similarly, level indicators, and to a lesser extent gain
indicators, are likely to give students the wrong signals about which schools to attend. In practice, this
means that prospective students, both academically advantaged and disadvantaged, could be fooled into
abandoning an excellent neighborhood school simple because the school served students that were
disproportionately academically disadvantaged. At the other extreme, these indicators could contribute
to complacency on the part of families whose children attend schools that disproportionately serve
academically advantaged students. In fact, these schools could be adding relatively little to the
achievement growth of their students. In short, indicators other than the value-added performance
indicator convey potentially inaccurate information about school quality and therefore could severely
harm the policy-making process and distort the school choices of students and families. As a result,
student achievement is apt to lower than it would otherwise be.
The consequences of using average test scores or gain indicators for purposes of public
accountability are, if anything, potentially much worse than in the cases discussed above. Why?
Level and gain indicators could severely distort the behavior of teachers and administrators and lead to
substantially reduced performance expectations for schools that disproportionately serve academically
disadvantaged students. (This point is discussed more fully in the next section.) Moreover, these35
indicators are biased against schools that disproportionately serve academically disadvantaged students
and communities and thus are undesirable from the standpoint of fairness.
The first effect is likely to be particularly acute if teachers and administrators are in any way
rewarded or penalized on the basis of their performance with respect to a given indicator. In a high-
stakes accountability system—a system that rewards teachers and administrators for their
performance—teachers and administrators are likely to respond to the incentive to improve their
measured performance by exploiting all existing avenues to improve measured performance. It is well
known, for example, that teachers may "teach narrowly to the test," although some tests are more
susceptible to this type of corruption than others. For tests that are relatively immune to this type of
corruption, teaching to the test could induce teachers and administrators to adopt new curriculums and
teaching techniques much more rapidly than they otherwise would. On the other hand, if school
performance is measured using level or gain indicators, teachers and administrators have the incentive
to raise measured school performance by teaching only those students who rate highly in terms of
average student and family characteristics, average prior achievement, and community characteristics.
As indicated in section III, even modest changes in these characteristics could dramatically improve a
school’s gain indicator or average test score. This phenomenon is referred to as creaming.
The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in environments where schools have
the authority to admit or reject prospective students and to expel already enrolled students. However,
the problem could also exist in more subtle, but no less harmful, forms. For example, schools could:
(1) create an environment that is relatively inhospitable to academically disadvantaged students, (2)
provide course offerings that predominantly address the needs of academically advantaged students, (3)
fail to work aggressively to prevent students from dropping out of high school, (4) err on the side of
referring "problem" students to alternative schools, (5) err on the side of classifying students as special
education students (if these students are exempted from state-wide testing), and (6) make it difficult36
for low-scoring students to participate in state-wide examinations. These activities are all designed to
improve average test scores in a school, not by improving school quality, but rather by catering to
high-scoring students while ignoring or alienating low-scoring students.
Instead of devoting excessive attention to high-scoring students, high-quality teachers and
administrators could gravitate to neighborhood schools that predominantly serve high-scoring students.
Hence, using the average test score as a high-stakes performance indicator could trigger an exodus of
highly skilled educators from schools that disproportionately serve academically disadvantaged
students.
VI. VALUE-ADDED INDICATORS: DATA REQUIREMENTS
Given the problems that exist with the average test score and other level indicators and, to a
lesser degree, the gain indicator, it is important to consider whether value-added indicators could
potentially be used as the core of school district, state, and national performance
indicator/accountability systems. There are at least two reasons to be optimistic in this regard. First,
value-added models have been used extensively over the last three decades by evaluators and other
researchers interested in education and training programs. Second, a number of districts and states,
including Dallas (Webster, Mendro, and Almaguer; 1992), South Carolina (Mandeville, 1994), and
Tennessee (Sanders and Horn, 1994), have successfully implemented value-added indicator systems.
Nonetheless, despite the promise of value-added indicator systems, it is clear that they require
a major commitment on the part of districts and states. In particular, districts and states must be
prepared to, one, test students frequently, ideally at every grade level, as is done in South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Dallas; and two, develop comprehensive district or state data systems that contain37
information on student test scores and student, family, and community characteristics.
26 These two
issues are discussed below.
Annual testing at each grade level is highly recommended for the following three reasons.
First, it maximizes accountability by localizing school performance to the most natural unit of
accountability, the grade level or classroom. Second, it yields up-to-date information on school
performance. Finally, it limits the amount of data that is lost due to student mobility. As the time
interval between tests increases, these problems become much more acute. In fact, for time intervals
of more than two years it could prove difficult, if not impossible, to construct valid and reliable value-
added (or gain) indicators for schools with high mobility rates. This problem arises because mobile
students generally must be excluded from the data used to construct value-added and gain indicators,
since both indicators require pre- and post-test data.
27 In schools with high student mobility,
infrequent testing diminishes the likelihood of ending up with student data that are both representative
of the school population as a whole and large enough to yield statistically reliable school performance
estimates.
28 Less frequent testing, say testing at grades kindergarten, 4, 8, and 12, might be
acceptable for national purposes, since student mobility is not really an issue at the national level.
29
For purposes of evaluating local school performance, however, the problems created by student
26The latter data are required as control variables in the value-added model.
27See Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969) for a critique of school performance indicators that include
mobile as well as nonmobile students.
28In schools with extremely high mobility rates it might be necessary to test students more than
once a year.
29A kindergarten test is needed so that the growth in student achievement in grades 1 through 4
can be monitored. In my view, the National Assessment of Educational Progress and recent proposals
for national testing in grades 4, 8, and 12 are seriously flawed by their failure to include a test at the
kindergarten or 1st grade level.38
mobility argue strongly for frequent testing, at least for schools and school districts where student
mobility is high.
The primary obstacle to developing a comprehensive data system is, in my opinion, the
difficulty of collecting extensive information on student and family characteristics. This issue is
potentially quite important because value-added indicators are often implemented using the rather
limited administrative data that are commonly available in schools, for example, race and ethnicity,
gender, special education status, limited English proficiency (LEP) status, eligibility for free or
reduced-price lunches, and whether a family receives welfare benefits. Researchers equipped with more
extensive data have demonstrated that parental education and income, family attitudes toward
education, and other variables are also powerful determinants of student achievement growth. It would
be useful for school districts and states to experiment with some alternative approaches for collecting
this type of data.
The consequence of failing to control adequately for these and other student, family, and
community characteristics is that feasible real-world value-added indicators are apt to be biased
because they absorb differences across schools in average unmeasured student, family, and community
characteristics as well differences in intrinsic school performance. This implies that a feasible value-
added indicator derived from a model with "weak" predictors of student achievement growth might be
only slightly better than a gain indicator (better in the sense of being more highly correlated with a
theoretically perfect value-added indicator). Even so, it is likely to be a much better indicator than the
average test score.
VII. VALUE-ADDED INDICATORS AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS
Some commentators have raised the concern that value-added indicators, because they control
(or adjust) for student, family, and community characteristics associated with student achievement39
growth, inevitably result in reduced performance expectations for schools and states that
disproportionately serve disadvantaged students.
30 Here, I demonstrate that the opposite is, in fact,
true. The key idea is that it is possible to derive school performance goals, defined in value-added
terms, that are fully consistent with high student-performance expectations. Moreover, these goals will
always be higher, not lower, for schools that disproportionately serve disadvantaged students.
To see this, suppose that G(g)
EX represents an achievement growth target for a given grade g.
Growth targets could be set so that the cumulative growth in achievement across grades would enable
all schools (including schools with very low initial achievement) to obtain a target level of
achievement by the end of a given grade, say 6th grade.
31 Given equation (5), the school
performance goal that is consistent with a specified growth target is equal to
The student and family adjustment factor (defined by (5)) represents the average contribution of
(7)
student, family, and community characteristics to the average level of student achievement. Since this
factor is lower for schools that disproportionately serve disadvantaged students, the effect of the
adjustment is to generate higher school performance goals for these schools than for other schools.
The reason is straightforward: in order to achieve a common student achievement goal it is necessary
for schools that disproportionately serve disadvantaged students to out-perform other schools.
If student achievement expectations are sufficiently high, the above procedure will almost
certainly produce school performance goals that are extremely ambitious for schools that
disproportionately serve disadvantaged students. This is a strength, not a weakness, of the value-added
30See, for example, Finn (1994).
31This approach would allow schools with very low initial achievement a period of six years to
catch up with schools with high initial achievement. The catch-up phase could, of course, be
shortened or lengthened.40
approach. If we as a society are serious about setting high expectations for all students, it is important
to accurately translate these performance expectations into accurate school performance goals. Given
concrete school performance goals we can then act accordingly to do whatever is necessary and
appropriate to assist schools in attaining these goals.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The average test score, one of the most commonly used indicators in American education, is
highly suspect as an indicator of school performance.
32 This indicator suffers from four major
deficiencies: it fails to localize school performance to the classroom or grade level, it aggregates
information on school performance that tends to be grossly out of date, it is contaminated by student
mobility, and it fails to distinguish the distinct value-added contribution of schools to growth in
student achievement from the contribution of student, family, and community factors. As a result, the
average test score is a weak, if not counterproductive, instrument of public accountability. The gain
indicator, if it can be computed, and the feasible value-added indicator avoid three of the four
problems that plague the average test score. The feasible value-added indicator has the major
advantage that it potentially eliminates the bias that exists in the gain indicator due to differences
across schools in student, family, and community characteristics, particularly if it is based on a model
that includes an extensive set of control variables. In this case, it fully eliminates the incentive for
schools to cream.
The value-added approach to measuring school performance relies on a statistical model to
identify the distinct contributions made by schools to growth in student achievement. The quality of a
value-added indicator is determined by four factors: the frequency with which students are tested, the
32Other level indicators, such as the median test score, are similarly suspect.41
quality and appropriateness of the tests that underlie the indicators, the adequacy of the control
variables included in the appropriate statistical models, and the technical validity of the statistical
models used to construct the indicators.
In terms of the first issue, I believe that states need to seriously consider testing students at
every grade level, as is currently done in South Carolina, Tennessee, and Dallas, or at least at every
other grade level, beginning with kindergarten. With respect to the second and third issues, it is
important that states make it a major priority to collect extensive and reliable information on student
and family characteristics and to develop state tests that are technically sound and fully attuned to their
educational goals. Finally, further research is needed to assess the sensitivity of estimates of school
performance indicators to alternative statistical models.42
APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIONS OF REPORTED SIMULATIONS
This appendix presents detailed specifications and results for the simulations presented in
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 5. Appendix B considers the simulations reported in Figure 4 and Table 2. The
first section presents the detailed specifications. Each simulation is defined in terms of intrinsic school
performance in a given grade g at a given point in time t. Average 10th grade achievement is
computed for each birth cohort. The birth cohort subscript is implied by the grade and time
subscripts: c=t-g-6. For simplicity, we assume that students begin 1st grade at age 6 and advance to
subsequent grades one year at a time. The second section reports intrinsic school performance and
steady state school performance for grades 1 to 10 by grade and cohort and 10th grade achievement.
School performance values at each grade level for a given year are reported on diagonal lines that run
from the bottom left to the top right of the tables.
Specifications
Figure 1. Average 10th Grade Achievement Given Alternative Patterns of Intrinsic School
Performance in Grades 1 to 6 and 7 to 10.
Panel A
Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 10:
a(g,t) = 0 if t = 1978, 1991
0 + (t-1991) if t = 1992, 2001
Panel B
Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 6:
a(g,t) = 0 if t = 1978, 2001
Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 7 to 10:
a(g,t) = 0 if t = 1978, 1991
0+2(t-1991) if t = 1992, 2001
Figure 2. Average 10th Grade Achievement Given Alternative Patterns of Intrinsic School
Performance Over Time.
Panel A
Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 10:
a(g,t) = 20 - (t-1971) if t = 1971, 1991
0 + (t-1991) if t = 1992, 200143
Panel B
Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 10:
a(g,t) = ì 20 - (t-1971) if t = 1971, 1986 ü
í 5 + (t-1986) if t = 1987, 1991 ý
î 10 if t = 1991, 2001 þ
Figure 3. Average 10th Grade Achievement Given Alternative Cycles of Decline and Recovery in
Intrinsic School Performance
Panel A
School 1, Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 10:
a(g,t) = 20 - 2(t-1981) if t = 1981, 1990
0 + 2(t-1991) if t = 1991, 2000
School 2, Intrinsic School Performance, Grades 1 to 10:
a(g,t) = 0 + 2(t-1981) if t = 1981, 1990
20 - 2(t-1991) if t = 1991, 2000
Note: These patterns repeat in twenty-year cycles.
Figure 5. Average 10th Grade Achievement Given Different Patterns of Student Mobility
Panel A. A Gradual Influx of Students
This simulation considers the effects of a gradual influx of one hundred students from
a low-gain school into a high-gain school that initially has one hundred students. Each year,
from 1992 to 2001, ten students from the low-gain school, one in each grade, move to the
high-gain school. The annual gains in the high- and low-gain schools are 20 and -20,
respectively. As in Table 3, 10th grade achievement is computed as the sum of prior gains in
grades 1 through 10.
Panel B.
This simulation is identical to the one reported for Panel A except that the influx of













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDENT MOBILITY SIMULATIONS
This appendix provides a technical description of the simulations reported in Table 2 and
Figure 4. These simulations were designed to highlight the effect of student mobility on the average
test score. The basic assumptions of the simulation model are as follows. First, intrinsic school
performance in a given school is the same at all grade levels and over time. Second, there are three
different levels of school performance, given by
a( 1 )=1 0
a ( 2 )=0
a (3) = -10.
Third, student mobility follows a Markov process. At the end of each school year students have a
probability (1-p) of staying in the school they are currently enrolled in and a probability p/2 of moving
to one of the other two schools. Hence, the annual student mobility rate is equal to p. Finally,
student, family, and community characteristics are identical for all students. Hence, the student and
community adjustment factor is identical for all schools and can be ignored.
Given these assumptions, students differ from each other only because they exhibit different
patterns of enrollment in each of the three school types. A specific enrollment pattern for grades 1
through 10 can thus be characterized by a ten-digit sequence of numbers, where a "1" indicates that a
student was enrolled in school type one, a "2" indicates that a student was enrolled in school type two,
etc. For example, a student enrolled in school one in grades 1 to 4, in school two in grades 5 to 7,
and in school three in grades 8 to 10 would have the following enrollment pattern: 1111 222 333.
The total number of sequences is equal to
(number of school types)
(number of grades) =3
10 = 59,049.
Given the student mobility rate p, the probability of each enrollment pattern i is given by
where c(i) = the number of school enrollment changes in a given enrollment pattern i. For example,
c(i) = 2 for the enrollment sequence 1111 222 333. Given a mobility rate of p = .02, the probability
of this sequence is equal to53
Student achievement at the end of 10th grade is determined simply by the number of years
enrolled in each type of school. Let represent the number of years enrolled
in each of the three school types for students with enrollment pattern i. Then, 10th grade achievement
for students in enrollment pattern i is given by
It is straightforward to compute the population mean and standard deviation of 10th grade
achievement, given a student’s enrollment status as of 10th grade. These numbers are reported in
Panels A and B of Table 2. First, generate a data set that includes the following variables for all
enrollment patterns, given an assumed student mobility rate:
Years enrolled in school type one: t(1, i)
Years enrolled in school type two: t(2, i)
10th grade student achievement: t(3, i)
Number of school enrollment changes: c(i)
Probability of enrollment pattern: w(i).
Second, use a standard statistics program to compute the weighted mean and standard deviation of
10th grade achievement, given 10th grade enrollment status. The enrollment pattern probability w(i) is
the appropriate weight.
Panels A and B of Table 2 report the population mean and standard deviation of 10th grade
achievement, by 10th grade enrollment status and the assumed student mobility rate. The standard
error of a sample mean is given by the standard deviation divided by the square root of the sample
size. This formula was used to compute the standard errors required to construct the 2/-2 standard
error interval illustrated in Figure 4.
Finally, Panel C of Table 2 reports the fraction of students who change schools one or more
times over intervals of four and nine years, respectively. These numbers were computed using the
following formula:
Prob (change over x years)=1-( 1-p )
x.
For example, given a student mobility rate of 0.2, the probability of changing schools at least once
over nine years is given by
1 - (1 - 0.2)
9 = 0.866,
as indicated in Table 2.54
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